Bark not only supplied the question; he also was the original supplier of its answer. He performed a "strict constructionist" analysis of the antitrust laws' legislative history in a famous and often-cited 1966 law review article. 55 Bark appeared to demonstrate how the legislative history of the Sherman Act established that when Congress debated and passed this law it had only one concern: increased economic efficiency.B6 As of this analysis he made an apparently convincing argument that, if the legislative debates were analyzed closely, the then-common "populist" views of antitrust, including the belief that the antitrust laws were to further a variety of social and political goals, such as combating the political power of big business, or assisting small businesses, were not a concern of Congress.£7The efficiency conclusion is now Chicago School gospel. Indeed, Judge Richard Posner recently asserted that virtually everyone now agrees 89 that the antitrust laws have a single objective-maximizing economic efficiency. BB The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the Chicago School is wrong, as to both congressional intent and to recent case law. The primary goal of antitrust actually is to prevent "unfair" transfers of wealth from purchasers to firms with market power. We submit that the antitrust laws on the books today best can be explained as a congressional declaration that the property right we term "consumers' surplus"B9 belongs to consumers,?o not to cartels or to no one. The antitrust laws were enacted primarily to award this relatively amorphous property right to consumers, and to prevent cartels and monopolies from taking it. Another way to express this is to note that tbe primary goal of the antitrust laws can be expressed in consumer protection terms?': these laws better define consumers' property rights and protect them from being stolen by firms with market power. 72 This chapter first will demonstrate that the wealth transfer concern is the primary reason for the passage of the antitrust laws and is a far more plausible explanation than the efficiency goal. Its next section will analyze the treatment of these issues in recent antitrust cases. It will show how these cases can be best explained in terms of a concern with wealth transfers, as opposed to a concern with efficiency. For these reasons, we conclude that the foundation of the Chicago School is flawed. and that the correct path of antitrust policy should not be determined by the view that increasing efficiency is more important than protecting consumers.
I. The Legislative History
Judge Bork argued that the original framers of the Sherman Act had a single intent: to enhance economic efficiency. He argued that "the whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no or a net loss in consumer welfare."73 Bork explicitly rejected distributive issues as a possible area of congressional concern: "[Ilt seems clear the income distribution effects of economic activity should be completely excluded from the determination of the antitrust legality of the activity."74 Bork pointed to dozens of statements revealing an overriding congressional concern that cartels and certain other business forms would acquire the power to artificially raise prices and restrict output,75 Bark presented many statements of concern by Senator Sherman 76 and other legislators 77 that some of the trusts and other businesses of the period had enough power to raise prices. Bork summarized this portion of the debates succinctly: " [t] he touchstone of illegality is raising prices to consumers. There were no exceptions."78 Since we know of no serious disagreement that this indeed was the preoccupation of the debates, we will not discuss it further. Bork then used modern economic analysis to explain how monopoly power Bork reasoned that since we now know that the "only" harm to "consumer welfare" from higher prices is allocative inefficiency, congressional displeasure with market power can fairly be equated with a concern about allocative inefficiency. He then presented a smaller, although still significant, number of quotations that showed a congressional desire to preserve and enhance corporate productive efficiency.ao On the basis of this evidence, Bork concluded that the antitrust laws embody only a concern for "consumer welfare," which he equated with the "maximization of wealth or consumer want satisfaction"81 and the aggregate economic efficiency of our economy. 82 The key question, however, is precisely why Congress objected when the trusts, cartels, and monopolies raised prices to consumers. As the diagram illustrates, these higher prices cause two direct types of economic effects: the transfer of surplus from consumers to cartels and monopolists, and allocative inefficiency. Which one was Congress's concern? Or were both a concern?
Bork's efficiency conclusion cannot reasonably account for many important statements from the Sherman Act's legislative history.83 For example, Senator Sherman termed the prices "extortion"84 and "extorted wealth.
H85 One congressman referred to the overcharges as "robbery,"86 and a complaint was made that the trusts "without rendering the slightest equivalent" have "stolen untold millions from the people."8? Another congressman complained that the beef trust "robs the farmer on the one hand and the consumer on the other."e" Another declared that the trusts were "impoverishing" the people through "robbery."89 Senator Hoar declared that monopolistic pricing was "a transaction the direct purpose of which is to extort from the community ... wealth which ought to be generally diffused over the whole community."90 Another senator complained: "They aggregate to themselves great enormous wealth by extortion .... "91 Do terms like "stealing," "robbery," "extortion," and "stolen wealth" sound like allocative inefficiency'r Is it not much more likely that Congress in effect awarded the property right we today call "consumers' surplus" to consumers, and under the antitrust laws, the taking of consumers' surplus by cartels constitutes theft?92
To further contrast the efficiency and wealth transfer goals, consider why stealing is illegal. Why does make it illegal for people to reach their hands into other peoples' wallets and take their money?
Stealing is inefficient. There is no doubt that if it were legal to steal, this would lead to inefficiency.93 But, do we condemn stealing because of its inefficiency effects? Is not the real reason we condemn stealing because it constitutes an "unfair" taking of property without consent and without compensation? Stealing is an unfair transfer of wealth, and this is the reason why stealing money out of someone's wallet is-and should be-illegal.
Moreover, even though main complaint about truststhat they were perceived to raise prices to purchasers-cannot equate to a concern with allocative inefficiency, could Congress primarily have been concerned with corporate productive efficiency? Did Congress pass the Sherman Act primarily to help corporations save costs and otherwise increase corporate productive efficiency?
While it is true the that enacted the antitrust laws did appreciate corporate they nevertheless passed the antitrust laws that in so many ways attacked these highly efficient organizations. 95 If all they had wanted to do was to encourage that form of industrial organization that was then the most productively efficient, they would have the trusts, not condemned them in the legislative debates and enacted a law that condemned many of their activities. Congress must have been concerned with other goals. This leaves the wealth transfer explanation as being most consistent with the evidence.
II. The Case Law
In recent years, the case law has largely adopted the view that the ultimate goal of the antitrust laws is to protect consumers, not increase efficiency. While most decisions do not address the issue, those that do almost always indicate that the fundamental objective of antitrust is to improve the welfare of consumers. When courts use the term "consumer welfare," moreover, they do not appear to be referring to economic Ju dges rarely describe the goal of antitrust as enhancing efficiency and, more important, they never say that conduct that harms consumers in the relevant market is justified if it increases the efficiency of the economy. While it is possible that courts are using "consumer welfare" as Bork did, recent opinions provide little evidence ofthat. Instead, most judges seem to believe that the aim of antitrust is to prevent conduct that deprives consumers of the benefits of competition and transfers their wealth to firms with market power.
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In section A, we provide an overview of the case law by explaining why most courts, even when they use the ambiguous term "consumer welfare," likely believe that the preeminent objective of the antitrust laws is to protect consumers, not enhance efficiency. Then we examine the cases themselves. In section B, we focus on recent Supreme Court and appellate court decisions that illuminate the ultimate purpose of the antitrust laws. In section C, we look at the area where the courts have most often faced a conflict between protecting consumers and enhancing efficiency-merger cases.
A. "Consumer Welfare" and the Welfare of Consumers
The term "consumer welfare" is ambiguous because it could refer either to the welfare of consumers in the relevant market or to economic efficiency. This ambiguity arose because Bork equated "consumer welfare" with the efficiency of the economy,97 and the Supreme Court quoted Bark when it declared that the legislative. history ofthe Sherman Act suggests it is a "consumer welfare prescription."Og As a result, when courts use "consumer welfare" today, could be invoking Bork's concept, not the literal meaning of the term, and thus could be indicating that what they really care about is total welfare, not the welfare of consumers. For four reasons, however, we doubt this is SO.99 First, some decisions clearly take the position that the ultimate objective of antitrust law is to benefit consumers, not increase efficiency. As we will see, in Brooke Group/GO the Supreme Court equated "consumer welfare" with the welfare of consumers, not with total welfare, and accorded primacy to the former.
Second, while most opinions are less clear, they appear to support a consumer-oriented view of antitrust law because they focus on consumer impact rather than efficiency. In assessing the conduct at issue, they expressly examine its effect on things that matter to consumers-such as price, quality, or choice-but they rarely examine its effect on total welfare.
Third, in recent years, very few decisions state that any aspect of efficiency is a goal of the antitrust laws and those that do refer only to allocalive efficiency. If these courts had been following Bork, they would have mentioned productive efficiency as wel1.101 Moreover, the decisions that identify allocative efficiency as a goal always treat it as a correlate of consumer impact, not an independent value. 102
Fourth, and most important, whenever the courts have addressed an actual or potential conflict between consumer well-being and efficiency, consumer interests have always prevailed. As section C illustrates, no recent decision has taken the position that an improvement in economic efficiency trumps an adverse impact on consumers.
B. Decisions Illuminating the Ultimate Objective
In contrast to Bork and Posner, antitrust decisions today rarely describe the ultimate goal of the antitrust laws as increasing efficiency. In recent years, however, many decisions have indicated that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect consumers or enhance consumer welfare. 
Supreme Court
In Brooke Group, the Court identified the "traditional concern" of the antitrust laws as "consumer welfare and price competition."104 The Court equated consumer welfare, moreover, not with economic efficiency but with the benefits received by consumers in the relevant market. In analyzing whether unsuccessful predatory pricing should be illegal, the Court noted that below-cost pricing could sometimes cause allocative inefficiency. It declared, however, that unsuccessful predatory pricing "produces lower aggregate prices in the market, and consumer welfare is enhanced."105 In measuring consumer welfare by the level of prices in the market rather than by allocative efficiency, the Court signaled that the ultimate aim of antitrust law is to enhance the well-being of consumers in the relevant market, not maximize economic efficiency or minimize inefficiency.lo6 Thus, the Court noted that unsuccessful predation is "in general a boon to consumers."107
In Weyerhaeuser/DB a more recellt case challenging predatory bidding rather than predatory pricing, the Court repeatedly compared the effects of the two practices on consumers. In total, the Weyerhaeuser opinion contains 12 references to consumer impact (e.g., "consumer welfare,"I09 "lower prices to consumers,"11O "consumer harm,"lll "effect on consumer prices"ll2). The opinion contains no references to economic efficiency. Although the Court ultimately adopted a test for predatory bidding that depends on the practice's effect on suppliers, not consumers, that is consistent with the legislative history's concern with the transfer of wealth from innocent parties (buyers or sellers) to firms with market power. Like the Congress that passed the Sherman Act, therefore, Weyerhaeuser focused on harm to these market participants, not to the efficiency of the economy.
In Leegin,113 the Court stated that the rule of reason "distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer's best interest."114 In articulating a one-to-one correspondence between effects of competition and effects on consumers, the Court indicated that the lodestar of antitrust analysis is impact on consumers. Elsewhere, the Court did state that the per se rule against resale price maintenance could cause manufacturers to engage in "inefficient" practices, 115 and it suggested that vertical price fixing was frequently "efficient."115 On the whole, however, the Court stressed the welfare of consumers. It repeatedly referred to matters of concern to consumers such as price levels, product quality, and options.
ll7 It never mentioned "total welfare" or "total surplus," even in explaining why inefficient vertical practices were undesirable. On the contrary, the Court said that inefficient practices harmed "consumer welfare" because they forced consumers to pay higher prices. 118
Appellate Courts
This same focus on the well-being of consumers rather than economic efficiency is evident in recent appellate opinions. For example, the Seventh Circuit stated: "The principal purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent overcharges to consumers,"119 The Sixth Circuit quoted a trial court's statement that "the very purpose of antitrust law is to ensure that the benefits of competition flow to purchasers of goods affected by the violation,"12o Writing for the D.C. Circuit, Judge Ginsburg characterized a court deciding an antitrust case as a "court of consumer welfare,"121 and his opinion suggests he meant the welfare of consumers, not economic efficiency. When he summarized the FTC's methodology for evaluating horizontal restraints, first announced in Mass. Board of Optometry,122 and explained why it was acceptable, he referred to impact on consumers eight times but never mentioned economic efficiency,123 Most important, when he described what a defendant must show under the Commission's methodology to justify a restraint, he did not use the metric of economic efficiency. He did not say that a restraint would be justified if it enhances productive efficiency more than it reduces allocative efficiency, or if it increases producers' surplus more than it diminishes consumers' surplus. Instead, a defendant must show that "the restraint in fact does not harm consumers or has 'procompetitive virtues' that outweigh its burden upon consumers,"124
Many other appellate decisions have also indicated that the ultimate test of whether a practice violates the antitrust laws is its impact on consumers. In Microsoft,125 the D.C. Circuit declared, "to be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist's act must have an 'anticompetitive effect: That is, it must harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers.""26 Both the Eleventh Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have quoted this statement, 127 The Tenth Circuit stated, "to be judged anticompetitive, the [conduct] must actually or potentially harm consumers:'"28 Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Easterbrook echoed the thesis of this article when he declared: "Calling the selection of components for one's product a 'tie-in' does not help to uncover practices that restrict output, drive up prices, and transfer wealth from consumers to producers."129
C. Merger Cases: Increased Efficiency Never Excuses Harm to Consumers
In merger cases, courts have frequently faced an actual or potential conflict between economic efficiency and the welfare of consumers.130 If a merger is likely to generate both cost savings and greater market power, the increase in productive efficiency could easily outweigh the loss in allocative efficiency, causing a net gain in overall efficiency, even though consumers in the relevant market are hurt because they have to pay higher prices. 131 No U.S. court, however, has ever allowed a merger that was likely to increase prices in the relevant market (or otherwise diminish consumer choice) because it would enhance economic efficiency. To the contrary, the courts have uniformly insisted that merging parties cannot establish an efficiencies defense unless they show both that the merger would generate significant cost savings and that enough of those savings would be passed on to consumers that consumers would benefit from (or at least not be hurt by) the merger.
In Heinz,132 for example, the nc. Circuit stated that a "defendant who seeks to overcome a presumption that a proposed acquisition would substantially lessen competition must demonstrate that the intended acquisition would result in significant economies and that these economies ultimately would benefit competition and, hence, consumers."133 In Swedish Match, 134 Judge Hogan held that the defendants' efficiency evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption of illegality because the defendants had not shown what proportion of their cost savings they would pass on and "how that will defeat the likely price increases in this market."135 Both of these decisions stand for the proposition that "an acquisition that lowers costs may still be unlawful 'if it results in an increased likelihood of higher prices.' "136 Other cases concur,137 and there is no decision to the contrary. The merger cases to date, therefore, have uniformly applied a consumer impact standard, rather than a total welfare standard, to the evaluation of claimed efficienciesPs
In some of these cases, moreover, this position was not simply dictum. The court found actual merger-specific efficiencies but disregarded some or all of them because they were unlikely to benefit consumers. In Stapies,139 for example, the defendants asserted that the challenged transaction would produce a variety of efficiencies, including better prices from vendors and reduced distribution costS.140 Although Judge Hogan identified numerous problems with this defense, he did not conclude that the merger would generate no significant cost savings. To the contrary, he stated that "the Court believes that there would be some efficiencies realized by the merger." 141 He ruled that these savings did not excuse the transaction, however, because most of them would not be passed on,142 and thus consumers in the relevant markets would likely pay higher rather than lower prices after the merger. 143 
Conclusion
The normative foundation of Chicago School antitrust policy is flawed. Both the legislative history of the antitrust laws and recent case law indicate that the fundamental goal of antitrust enforcement is not increasing economic efficiency. It is protecting consumers in the relevant market from practices that deprive them of the benefits of competition and transfer their wealth to firms with market power. Notes 1. US. antitrust law was adopted to contain private power; to give free and fair access to market actors without power; and to try to assure "that consumers get to determine who wins the competitive race. 18. This paper is about antitrust law other than cartel law for the following reasons: The strong law against hard-core cartels (meaning: price, output, or market division agreements among competitors that are designed only to get rid of the competition among the parties and have no credible claim of being, for example, a synergistic joint venture) has been a staple of antitrust enforcement for a hundred years and is supported by all perspectives on antitrust. Liberals or pluralists support the law because cartels exploit their customers or suppliers and because they paradigmatically offend the principle of market governance by competition, not powerful firms. Libertarians or conservatives might support the law because cartels are inefficient and output limiting; and, since carte lists have no excuse that they are responding to and serving the market, the costs of error from the prohibition are virtually nonexistent. In the matter of cartels, liberals and libertarians meet. The law is supported by economics and socio-political concerns. Only industrial policy advocates are likely to take exception.
19. Note that the outcome perspective requires that private action, to be caught by the law, must (probably) decrease output. This means that most tying and other uses of leverage by dominant firms, even if unjustified, will not be caught by antitrust. Leveraging is "only" a use of power, (1955) . Note that Sumner's argument was not that markets would always work well but that, however they worked, no law could stop them. As for the professional economists, "insofar as is known," Congress considered one antitrust bill after another without calling on their advice. The legislators of the time distrusted experts. However, if Congress had sought the advice ofthe economists, it could not have expected support for the Sherman Act. Id. at 120-21.
21. Irwin Stelzer argues that process and access are all the more important in high tech industries, "'lest high-tech' be converted to 'my-tech' by dominant firms" and powerful incumbents slow down or exclude "incursions oftechnologically superior challengers." Stelzer, supra note 1 at 11, 14.
As to the importance of mavericks, 36. Nonetheless, in a subsequent case charging predatory buying (Weyerhaeuser) in which the dominant defendant overbought saw logs at inflated prices to eliminate its rivals from the market and did eliminate them, the Court reaffirmed its dictum in Brooke Group. It said that price predation almost never happens. The Court declared that predatory buying is the mirror image of predatory selling and that enjoining the high buyprice (the first leg of buyer predation) was just as harmful to consumers as enjoining a low selling price, and that therefore the tough standards of proof for predatory selling should apply equally to predatory buying. 70. We use the term "consumers" to include all individual or business purchasers of products and services, regardless whether they are the ultimate end users.
71. This article will only address the price and quantity effects of situations of antitrust concern, and accordingly will only contrast the efficiency and wealth transfer approaches. Sometimes, however, consumer welfare cannot adequately be protected by antitrust enforcement that only considers price and closely related areas like cost and quantity. The "consumer choice" approach is another, more complex way to articulate the goals of the antitrust laws in those situations when non-price issues are at stake. "Consumer choice" is an emerging paradigm that also is completely economic in nature. It does incorporate the wealth transfer effects of market power. It also differs from the efficiency model in that it gives greater weight to short term non-price choices having to do with quality or variety, and also to long term innovation effects. 78. Bork, supra note 55, at 15. 79. To raise prices, a monopoly or cartel reduces output from the competitive level. The goods no longer sold are worth more to would-be purchasers than they would have cost society to produce. This foregone production is a pure social loss and constitutes the "allocative inefficiency" of monopoly or cartel pricing. For example, suppose that widgets cost $1.00 in a competitive market (their cost of production plus a competitive profit). Suppose a monopolist would sell them for $2.00. A potential purchaser that would have been willing to pay up to $1.50 will not purchase at the $2.00 level. Since a competitive market would have sold the widgets for less than they were worth to this potential purchaser, the monopolist's reduced production has decreased the consumer's satisfaction without producing any countervailing social benefits. This loss is termed "allocative inefficiency." For an extended discussion and formal proof that monopoly pricing creates allocative inefficiency, 92. Congress wanted to protect all those who purchased products and services; it made no distinction between wealthy and poor consumers, or between business and individual consumers. Nor did Congress seem concerned whether purchasers absorbed the overcharges or passed them on. While Congress frequently referred to "consumers," it did not appear to care only about ultimate consumers. In other words, any direct purchaser should be deemed a "consumer" for antitrust purposes, regardless what they decided to do with their purchase. Otherwise every price rise by a cartel, etc. would have to be examined to determine whether it affected ultimate consumers, or whether instead it had been absorbed by intermediaries. This can be a very difficult undertaking. Many of the complexities that would arise if antitrust were only concerned with the welfare of ultimate consumers are analyzed in Gregory J. Werden 103. To be sure, it is even more common for courts to say that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote competition or the competitive process. See Kirkwood, supra note 63, at 30-31. Since the courts almost never define competition or the competitive process, however, these formulations do not provide a concrete guide for determining whether or not the antitrust
